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A COLLAPSE OF INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
THE LO DOLCE CASE
International extradition "may be sufficiently defined to be the
surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or con-
victed of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to
punish him, demands the surrender."1 When the United States through
some person designated by statute or treaty is confronted with the
request of a foreign government for the extradition 2 of some person
accused or convicted of a crime,3 it first must ascertain whether it has
an extradition treaty with that government. If there is no treaty,
there will be no extradition.4 Where such a treaty exists, the right
of the requesting government to demand the surrender of that person
under the treaty is contingent upon the presence of three conditions:
(i) the crime charged must be one covered by the treaty;5 (2) the evi-
dence presented must be sufficient to justify the apprehension and trial
of the person charged with the alleged crime had it been committed in
'Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U. S. 270, 289, 22 S. Ct. 484, 492, 46 L. ed. 534, 545 (19o).
'Under the international extradition practice of the United States, the request-
ing foreign government must sometime either before, during, or just after an extra-
dition proceeding address a formal requisition to the Secretary of State before the
surrender of the sought-after person will be made. 62 Stat. 822 (1948), 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 3184 (1951); Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 194, 23 S. Ct. 98, 103, 47 L. ed. 13o, 138
(1902).
3A distinction has been drawn between a person who was before the court and
convicted but later escaped, and one who was tried and convicted in absentia. The
latter is treated as if he were only charged with a crime; therefore, the evidence
presented for his extradition must be of the same nature as of that given where
the person has not been tried. 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1942) 52.
'The "principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart
from treaty." Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U. S. 276, 287, 54 S. Ct. 191, 193, 78 L. ed.
315, 320 (1933); Valentine, Police Commissioner of New York City v. United States
ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U. S. 5, 9, 57 S. Ct. 1o, 102, 8i L. ed. 5, 8 (1936); 2 Hyde,
International Law (2nd rev. ed. 1947) 1o15.
C62 Stat. 822 (1948), 18 U. S. C. A. § 3184 (1951); 4 Hackworth, Digest of In-
ternational Law (1942) 41. A person who has been surrendered to the requesting
government "can only be tried for one of the offenses described in that treaty ...."
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 430, 7 S. Ct. 234, 246, 3o L. ed. 425, 432
(1886). And when the executive department and the courts of the asylum country
decided that the crime was within the treaty between it and the demanding na-
tion, that decision is conclusive and is not subject to review in the courts of the
extraditing state. Greene v. United States, 154 Fed. 401, 410 (C. C. A. 5 th, 19o7).
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the country of asylum; 6 and (3) the requesting government must have
had justification over the accused person at the time when the offense
is alleged to have occurred.
7
The intense interest which was occasioned by the attempt of the
Italian government to extradite Carl Lo Dolce from the United States
in the extradition proceeding of In re Lo Dolce8 has been revived by
the conclusion of Lo Dolce's murder trial in absentia in Italy, Novem-
ber 6, 1958, the appeal that was taken from this decision, November
25, 1954,9 and a recently reported grand jury investigation which may
result in a reopening of the case. 10 In the extradition proceedings of
In re Lo Dolce, Italy vainly attempted to obtain the extradition of
Lo Dolce so as effectively to carry out on the person of the accused any
possible conviction which might result (and did) from the prosecution
of him in the courts of that country for the murder of his command-
ing officer while both were operating with a United States Army mis-
sion in 1944 behind the German lines in northern Italy.
The facts of the case revealed a gruesome and almost unbeliev-
able story. During World War II, Major William V. Holohan, com-
6The scope or sufficiency of the evidence is involved, not the admissibility or
nature of the evidence; and such scope apparently will be met if there is "reasonable
ground to suppose him [the accused] guilty as to make it proper that he should
be tried ...." Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U. S. 508, 512, 31 S. Ct. 704, 705, 55 L. ed.
83o, 833 (1911); Collins v. Loisel, 259 U. S. 309, 42 S. Ct. 469, 66 L. ed. 956 (1921).
7United States law on international extradition expressly provides that the
person sought can only be arrested or examined after it has been shown that that
person committed the crime charged within the jurisdiction of the requesting
government. 62 Stat. 822 (1948), 18 U. S. C. A. § 3184 (1951); 4 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law (1942) 69-76.
8 o6 F. Supp. 455 (W. D. N. Y. 1952).
'Lo Dolce was found guilty and was sentenced to seventeen years imprisonment,
which he need never fear serving unless he returns to Italy. N. Y. Times, Nov.
7, 1953, P. 1, col. 5. Another American party to the crime, Aldo Icardi, was given
a life sentence; three Italians were acquitted. N. Y. Times, supra. Two Italian
lawyers appealed the Icardi and Lo Dolce in absentia convictions without their
consent or knowledge. N. Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1954, p. 5, col. 4. The Turin Court
of Appeals upheld Icardi's life sentence, and Lo Dolce's seventeen-year sentence
was increased five years. N. Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1954, p. 2, col. 7.
20A further development in the case is reported in N. Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1955,
p. 6E, cols. 1-3: "A Federal grand jury in Washington is investigating one of the
most bizarre cloak-and-dagger dramas to come out of World War II ... The grand
jury inquiry, now progressing in utmost secrecy, is apparently an effort to find
out whether the two Americans can be, or should be, tried again over here...."
An Associated Press report of Aug. 29, 1955, reports that the federal grand jury
has indicted Aldo Icardi, Major Holohan's second in command, for perjury in
falsely testifying before a House armed services subcommittee investigating the case
in March, 1933. Lo Dolce did not testify before the subcommittee. See Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Aug. 3o, 1955, p. 7, cols. 5-7-
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manding officer of a unit of the United States Army called The
Chrysler Mission, operated for several months behind enemy lines in
Northern Italy. Carl Lo Dolce and Aldo Icardi, a sergeant and lieu-
tenant, respectively, were under the Major's command on this mis-
sion. Friction grew up between Major Holohan and Lieutenant Icardi
as to how the mission should be conducted. As a result, Icardi and
Lo Dolce decided to murder Major Holohan. They procured some
potassium cyanide, and on the evening of December 6, 1944, a por-
tion of this deadly poison was placed in the Major's soup. He became
ill and retired to his room. Fearful that their murder plans might be
thwarted, Lo Dolce and his cohort flipped a coin to determine who
should shoot Major Holohan. Lo Dolce lost on the flip; he took a
revolver, went to the Major's room and shot him twice through the
head. The body was placed in a bag, weighted and thrown into a near-
by lake. The recovery from a lake of the victim's body in 1950, coupled
with the written confessions of Lo Dolce and others implicated in the
crime and various other items of evidence, induced the Italian gov-
ernment to request Lo Dolce's surrender for trial."
The Secretary of State issued a certificate authorizing the appre-
hension of Lo Dolce and the institution of the extradition proceedings
which were then brought by the authorized complainant of Italy, James
Battistoni, Consular Agent for the Republic of Italy,' 2 before the
Federal District Court for the Western District of New York.' 3 The
nBecause both Icardi and Lo Dolce had been honorably discharged before the
discovery of the crime, they could not be tried by Army court martial; and because
the murder took place in Italy, they could not be tried by an American civilian
court. Today both are free men. For a more detailed account of the facts of the
crime see In re Lo Dolce, io6 F. Supp. 455 (W. D. N. Y. 1952), and the following
editions of the New York Times: N. Y. Times, May 28, 1953, P- 1, col. 7; Aug. 8,
1953, P. 4, col. 3; Oct. 4, 1953, P. 4, col. 1; Oct. 17, 1953, P. 4, col. 8; Oct. 20, 1953.
p. 13, col. 6; Oct. 21, 1953, p. 19, col. 1; Oct. 22, 1953, P- 16, col. 1; Oct. 23, 1953,
P. 9, col. 1; Oct. 24, 1953, P. 9, col. 2; Oct. 27, 1953, p. 17, col. 2; Oct. 29, 1953, p.
3. col. 4; Oct. 30, 1953, p. 5, col. 5; Oct. 31, 1953, p. 7, col. 7; Nov. 1, 1953, P. 29,
col. 5; Nov. 4, 1953, P- 12, Col. 4; Nov. 6, 1953, P. 10, col. 4; Nov. 7, 1953, P. 1, col.
5; Nov. 8, 1953, § IV, p. 2., col. 4; July 26, 1953, p. 15, col. 1.
"It does not matter what person makes the complaint under oath so long as
that individual has been duly authorized to bring such complaint by the foreign
government asking for extradition. President of the United States ex. rel. Caputo
v. Kelly, 92 F. (2d) 6o3 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Ex parte Sternaman, 77 Fed. 595 (N. D.
N. Y. 1896). In re Herres, 33 Fed. 165 (C. C. D. C. Minn. 1887); In re Kelly, 26 Fed.
852 (C. C. D. C. Minn. 1886).
12When brought in a federal court the proceeding is to be initiated before a
judge or commissioner of the district court nearest to the place where the accused
was found. This generally means that the proceeding will be held in a district
court of the United States of the state where the person sought resides. Pettit v
Walshe, 194 U. S. 205, 24 S. Ct. 657, 48 L. ed. 938 (19o3); In re Mitchell, 171 Fed.
289 (S. D. N. Y. 19o9).
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court refused to grant the request of Italy, holding that the Peace
Treaty of 1947 between the two nations,14 which reestablished the
extradition treaty of 1868,15 and taken in relation therewith, failed to
apply because the requesting government did not have jurisdiction of
the accused when the crime was committed. The court in reaching its
decision based its holding upon two grounds: (i) the immunity of
United States military forces in enemy territory from the laws and
tribunals of the occupied hostile country, and (2) the lack of juris-
diction of the Italian government over northern Italy at the time
of the alleged crime because of her absence of physical control and
authority over the area.
According to the court, notwithstanding the suspension of hostili-
ties with Italy by armistice on September 8, 1943, a state of war con-
tinued to exist between the United States and Italy until the signing
of the Peace Treaty of 1947.16 Therefore, Italy was still the enemy
of the United States at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime. If this conclusion was correct, then the court was on firm foot-
ing in adopting as its precedent the case of Coleman v. Tennessee,17
which soundly anchored the obvious principle that American troops
were not to be subjected to the judicial jurisdiction of an enemy
"Actually, this was a multilateral treaty of peace between Italy and the Allied
Countries, signed in Paris, France, February lo. 1947, which became effective be-
tween Italy and the United States on September 15, 1947. 61 Stat. 1245 (1947). The
English text of the treaty begins at 6i Stat. 1369 (1947). Throughout the remainder
of this Note, whenever this treaty of peace is cited, page numbers 1245 and 1369
will be given together in one citation.
1 3Article 44 of 61 Stat. 1245, 1369 (1947), "expressly provided that the Allied
or Associated Power would notify Italy (within six months of September 15, 1947)
which of the pre-war bilateral treaties it desired to keep and by note dated February
6, 1948, the Department of State listed the (Extradition) Treaty of 1868 [i 5 Stat.
629 (1868)] as one which it desired to keep in force." In re Lo Dolce, 1O6 F. Supp.
455, 458 (W. D. N. Y. 1952). Extradition treaties are retroactive and include offenses
that were committed prior to their conclusion or existence unless a specific clause
expressly precludes such prior crimes. United States ex rel. Oppenheim v. Hecht,
16 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); In De Giacomo, 12 Blatch. 391, 21 Int. Rev. Rec.
205, Fed Cas. No. 3747 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1874). And the Treaty of Extradition of
1868 was said to have a retroactive effect, In re Lo Dolce, supra; however, it was not
made applicable by the Treaty of Peace of 1947 with Italy to the crime in ques-
tion because that country lacked jurisdiction of the crime when it occurred.
"A cessation of hostilities by armistice or other agreement does not end a war.
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 16o, 68 S. Ct. 1429, 92 L. ed. 1881 (1947); Woods v.
Miller Co., 333 U. S. 138, 69 S. Ct. 421, 92 L. ed. 596 (1947); Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 S. Ct. 1o6, 64 L. ed. 194 (1919);
United States v. Anderson, 9 Wall. 56, 19 L. ed. 615 (1869).
1797 U. S. 509, 24 L. ed. iii8 (1878).
when within the enemy's country.' s But counsel for Italy contended
before the court that the Coleman case should have no authoritative
bearing upon the decision of the Lo Dolce proceeding because in
October, 1943, Italy had declared war on Germany and therefore
was not an enemy of, but a co-belligerent with, the United States
against Germany when the alleged offense was committed in 1944.19
Thus, it was argued that Italy's status as an enemy was only of a
theoretical nature, whereas the Coleman case test for the application
of that rule should be "enmity in point of fact." 20 In rejecting the
argument, the opinion of the court implied in effect that even if the
invaded territory of Italy is here to be regarded as that of a friendly
nation, there would be no possible way in which she could apply her
own law to United States troops upon Italian territory without en-
dangering the effective operation of the United States army or mis-
sion in the area. 21 The court declined to accept the Italian gov-
ernment's contention that the exemption of amicable troops from the
laws of the occupied nation should apply only when necessary to the
maintenance of discipline and cohesiveness in the army.
22
However, even had it been held that Italian law could apply to
American troops within Italy, Lo Dolce still would not have been sub-
ject to extradition under the court's decision. For the Italian govern-
ment was said to be without jurisdiction over the offense within the
extradition treaty terms because "the demanding government was
not then, with its armies or otherwise, physically in control of the
place of the crime."23 So saying, without any further development,
analysis, or citations of authority, the court dispensed with discussion
upon this interpretation of jurisdiction. The Italian government had
"8Dow v. Johnson, ioo U. S. 158, 25 L. ed. 632 (1879); Hamilton v. McClaughry,
136 Fed. 445 (D. C. Kan. 19o5); Notes (1953) 6 Fla. L. Rev. 254; (1953) 66 Harv. L.
Rev. x36.
uItaly declared war on Germany on October 13, 1943. According to the Peace
Treaty of 1947, by that declaration Italy also became a co-belligerent of the Al-
lies against Germany. 61 Stat. 1245, 1369 (1947).
!"For this argument of counsel for the Italian government, see Fink and Schwartz,
International Extradition. The Holohan Murder Case (1953) 59 A. B. A. J. 297, 347.
a"It is well settled that a foreign army permitted to march through a friendly
country, or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place." In re Lo Dolce,
1o6 F. Supp. 455, 459 (W. D. N. Y. 1952), quoting Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S.
509, 515, 24 L. ed. 1118, 1122 (1878). The rule embodied within this quote was first
expounded by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden,
7 Cranch 116, 2 Curtis 478, 3 L. ed. 287 (1812).
"For this contention see Fink and Schwartz, International Extradition: The
Holohan Murder Case (1953) 39 A. B. A. J. 297, 347.
2In re Lo Dolce, io6 F. Supp. 455, 460 (W. D. N. Y. 1952).
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argued that the term "jurisdiction" for the purposes of extradition
should be interpreted to mean sovereignty, and not tangible control
over a territory. Under that view, it was reasoned that since the crime
was committed upon Italian territory within the sovereignty of Italy,
it was committed within her jurisdiction and therefore extradition
should be granted.24 Perhaps the case of United States v. Rice,25 which
holds that while an enemy force occupies foreign soil it has full sov-
ereign rights over the territory and that the jurisdiction of the invaded
country does not act retroactively over the affected area after with-
drawal of the invaders, may be authority to support the position
making jurisdiction depend on physical control.26
The court logically could have agreed with each of the contentions
of the Italian government and by so doing provided the means of
bringing the alleged offender to trial. In regard to other issues involv-
ing laws of the United States, jurisdiction has not been deemed to be
synonymous with physical control. In the case of United States v.
Spela, 27 the Supreme Court found the jurisdiction of the United
States to be equivalent to its sovereignty under the scope of the Federal
Tort Claims Act. According to that case, by virtue of a lease agree-
ment with Great Britain, the United States exercised full control
and authority over Harman Field, Newfoundland, when and where
the claim originated. Yet despite such control, it was held that the
leased territory was not within the jurisdiction of the United States
in respect to the Federal Tort Claims Act because Harman Field re-
mained within the sovereignty of Great Britain and without that of
the United States. Further, the decision of Central Railroad Company
2'See Fink and Schwarz, International Extradition: The Holohan Murder
Case (1953) 39 A. B. A. J. 297, 347, for this argument of the Italian government.
24 Wheat. 246, 4 Curtis 39', 4 L. ed. 562 (1819).
26This may be inferred by considering the physical control-in-jurisdiction
ground as one of the "rights" which Judge Knight said were ceded by Italy during
the war: "It may be true that the Italian government had not lost ... its sovereignty
over the boundaries which it occupied prior to the war, yet while any of the
enemy armies were within such boundaries... certain of its [Italian government's]
rights were given up, ceded, severed or abandoned by that sovereign for the time."
In re Lo Dolce, 1o6 F. Supp. 455, 458 (W. D. N. Y. 1952). And since United States
v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246, 4 Curtis 391, 4 L. ed. 562 (1819) was one of the cases used
to support this statement.in the principal case, there would seem to be merit in
reaching that inference and in citing the Rice decision as a possible authority
for the proposition that jurisdiction is dependent upon physical dominion. However,
if that is a fallacious inference, then it seems that this second ground of the Lo
Dolce case must be accepted (if accepted at all) per se as authoritative.
27338 U. S. 217, 70 S. Ct. 10, 94 L. ed. 3 (1949).
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of New Jersey v. Jersey City28 could have been adopted as authority
by the court to determine the meaning of jurisdiction under the treaty
of extradition. Under the rule of that case, when the sovereignty of
one state conflicts with the jurisdiction of another over a certain ter-
ritory, the state with sovereignty prevails. Therefore, by analogy,
Italy could have exerted jurisdiction over the alleged crime because
its sovereignty was superior to any jurisdiction the Germans might
have had over northern Italy. (It could be argued that through the
Italian partisans, who seemingly exercised dominion over the general
area wherein the crime occurred,29 at the time of its commission the
Italian government was in control of this territory, for after Italy's
declaration of war against Germany in 1943, these partisans no long-
er were acting merely as a resistance movement, but for the post-
Mussolini government of Italy.)3° Secondly, Coleman v. Tennessee5l
was concerned with a crime committed in Tennessee during the Civil
War by a member of the occupying Union troops. Since that state was
a member state of the then still-insurgent Confederacy which con-
tinued to combat the Union forces, it remained a real enemy until
the South's surrender and defeat. In contrast, for all intents and pur-
poses Italy was no longer a foe but an ally of the United States be-
cause she had formed a new government, severed completely her Axis
ties, and declared war on Germany, who from that moment on alone
retained the status of an actual hostile. Therefore, Judge Knight could
have held that the Coleman case applied only to circumstances where
in reality the forces involved were enemies, thus excluding from its
application the situation in the Lo Dolce proceeding because at the
most the position of Italy was only technically that of an enemy.
3 2
:2 0 9 U. 5. 473, 28 S. Ct. 592, 92 L. ed. 896 (19o7). And the Department of
State has also likened jurisdiction within an extradition treaty with sovereignty.
4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1942) 70.
zIndication of the partisan's control can be gathered from the previously
cited editions of the New York Times, note io, supra.
Before the overthrow of Mussolini's fascistic government on July 25, 1943
(See N. Y. Times, July 26, 1943, p. 1, cols, 2, 4, 6-8) the partisians battled both
German and Italian Fascists. However, after the Bagdolio government under King
Victor Emmanuel was established (N. Y. Times, supra) and Italy had declared
war on Germany (note 21, supra) the Italian government and the partisans be-
came united in common cause against Germany and the Fascists. And by the
Treaty of Peace of 1947 between the Allies and Italy, the Allied Countries con-
sidered both Italian government forces and partisan forces as constituents of the
army of Italy. 61 Stat 1245, 1246, 1369, 1370 (1947).
m97 U. 5. 509, 24 L. ed. iii8 (1878).
"The language of the court in the Coleman case would imply that it had
in mind open hostility. "The fact that war is waged between two countries...."
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Lastly, the theory behind the exemption of friendly invading troops
from the invaded country's tribunals, according to Schooner Ex-
change v. M'Faddon,33 is to prevent interference with the foreign
army's military operations which are essential to the fulfillment of the
purpose of the invasion. But certainly it would never be claimed that
murder, especially within the ranks, is necessary to carry out that pur-
pose, nor that murder is part of a soldier's duties. In fact, such a crime
would seem to be more detrimental to the achievement of the army's
function than any prosecution of the crime by the occupied territory's
judiciary could ever be. Thus, to include that act of murder within the
coverage of the principle set forth in the case of the Schooner Ex-
change seems to be incongruous because it is outside the scope of the
reason for the exemption, and the court could have so interpreted that
decision, thereby accepting Italy's proposed restriction upon the
limits of the immunization of friendly troops.
34
Then too, the practice of extradition was developed to eliminate
the possibility of a crime going unpunished and to afford expression
of the asylum state's regard with respect the administration of jus-
tice of the demanding state. For extradition not only shows that the
asylum country itself denounces the crime and deems it preferable
that the country where the act occurred should prosecute, but it also
indicates a diminishing of distrust among the family of nations.35 Had
Judge Knight fully acknowledged these reasons for honoring a request
of extradition when considering the arguments presented by Italy, he
might more readily been have susceptible to their feasibility, thus
granting the extradition of Lo Dolce.
But since Italy was not permitted to extradite Lo Dolce, he is not
subject to trial or punishment unless he somehow falls into the hands
of the Italian authorities in Italy. The military law of the United
States existing at the time terminated the jurisdiction of the United
States military authority over a serviceman as of the time of his com-
plete separation from the military.36 Furthermore, no criminal courts
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509, 516, 24 L. ed. s118, 1122 (x878); and again
in the same case at 517 and 1122: "Tennessee was one of the insurgent States ...
against which war was waged."
n7 Cranch 116, 2 Curtis 478, 3 L. ed. 287 (1812).
USee note 22, supra.
352 Hyde, International Law (2nd rev. ed. 1947) 1013; Fenwick, International Law
(3rd ed. 1948) 33o.
""The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction ... ceases on discharge or
other separation from ... service .... " United States Army's Manual for Courts
Martial (1928) par. io, as cited in United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy,
168 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1948); United States ex rel Hirshberg v. Cook, 336
of the United States were or are competent tribunals because this
nation's criminal law requires the crime to be perpetrated within its
territory.3
7
However, several steps have been taken to avoid any future situation
in which no authority can prosecute United States military personnel
for offenses committed by them while on foreign soil. Because of the
passage of the Uniform Military Code of Justice38 in 1951, a person
who now commits one of several designated crimes during his mili-
tary tenure remains subject to the jurisdiction of the military courts,
"at any time without limitation," even though at the time he is
charged with the offense he is no longer a member of the Armed
Forces.3 9 But, by virtue of the same Code, prosecution of crimes of a
specified lesser nature are governed by applicable statutes of limi-
tation effective from the moment of the crime's commission.4 0 Thus,
in situations involving offenses subject to such statutes, it is conceiv-
able that someone may follow in Lo Dolce's footsteps and yet escape
punishment for his offense. 4' But the United States has taken further
U. S. 2o, 216, 69 S. Ct. 530, 533, 93 L. ed. 621, 626 (1948); Ex parte Drainer,
65 F. Supp. 410 (N. D. Cal. 1946), att'd, 158 F. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 9th, 1947).
3'United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 43 S. Ct. 39, 67 L. ed. 149 (1922); Fen-
wick, International Law (3 rd ed. 1948) 265; Starke, An Introduction to Interna-
tional Law (1947) 128, 129. But see note io, supra.
n64 Stat. 107 (1950), 50 U. S. C. A. §§551-741 (1951).
nArticle 43 (a) states: "A person charged with desertion or absence without
leave in time of war, or with aiding the enemy, mutiny, or murder, may be tried
and punished at any time without limitation." 64 Stat. 107, 121 (195o), 50 U. S. C. A.
§618 (1951).
"In article 43 (b), the limitation is three years after the commission of the
offenses set out in articles 19 through 132 (§§713-726), and in article 43 (c), the
limitation is two years in regard to punishment under article 15 (§571). However,
because of article 43 (d), the periods from which the accused is not within ter-
ritory over which the United States can apprehend him, or is in civil custody, or
in the hands of the enemy, shall not be included within the period of limitation
prescribed in 43 (b) and (c.) 64 Stat. 107, 121, 122 (1g5o), 5o U. S. C. A. § 618 (1951).
"Assuming the Code was in effect at the time, had the crime of Lo Dolce
been any of those enumerated in articles 119 through 132 of the Code rather
than that of murder, he would have escaped prosecution because a three-year
statute of limitations would have been applicable (see note 40, supra). In April of
1946, the accused rejoined the American forces, In re Lo Dolce, io6 F. Supp. 455, 457
(WV. D. N. Y. 1952); therefore, if article 43 (d) (see note 4o , supra) operated to keep
the statute of limitations from running until he was within the jurisdiction of the
authorities of the United States, his rejoining the American forces tolled the
statute of limitations. In October of 1946, Lo Dolce was honorably discharged
from the service, In re Lo Dolce, supra, at 457. The earliest that any charges could
have been brought against Lo Dolce was June 16, 1950, when Holohan's body
was recovered from the lake. In re Lo Dolce, supra, at 456. Thus, at least a period
of four years would have intervened between the running of the statute and the
first possible charges. Therefore, the prosecution of Lo Dolce would have been
barred by the statute of limitations.
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steps in the revising of its military law. In i951, this nation became a
party to an agreement with the other North Atlantic Treaty powers
governing jurisdiction over the troops of one member state stationed
within another member state. With regard to the United States, this
pact acted to remove a large portion of the cloak of jurisdictional
immunity covering the nation's military forces stationed abroad in
those friendly states by giving the occupied country not only concur-
rent jurisdiction over such troops but also the prerogative over this
country in the first instance to exercise that right of jurisdiction.
42
However, this pact is limited in application solely to the North At-
lantic Treaty nations.
43
Nevertheless, regardless of the progress made towards precluding
a future "Lo Dolce" of the military forces from evading actual punish-
ment at the hands of justice, should a civilian citizen of the United
States commit a crime in foreign territory similar in nature to that
of northern Italy during the German occupation, he or she would
not be amenable to that territory's jurisdiction for extradition pur-
poses.4 4 Therefore, to prevent a future result similar to that occasioned
by In re Lo Dolce45 regarding members of the military, and to pre-
serve the jurisdiction of a competent tribunal in the posed case in-
volving a civilian, Congress should expressly define the term "juris-
diction" as found in extradition treaties46 to mean sovereignty, and
thereby provide the foreign nation wherein the crime occurred with
jurisdiction over the offense.
It is submitted that even in the absence of Congressional action,
the United States authorities who must determine whether under an
extradition treaty a requesting government has jurisdiction of an al-
leged offense should accept the correct definition of the term "jurisdic-
tion" within such treaty to be sovereignty, and apply it accordingly.
DoNALD R. KLENK
JAMEs M. GABLER
,Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Force, Cind. No. 8279 (1951), as cited and discussed in Note (1952)
65 Harv. L. Rev. 1072.
"The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its members can be found
in 63 Stat. 2241 (1949).
"Interpreted as "physical control" over territory, see In re Lo Dolce, io6 F. Supp.
455, 46o (W. D. N. Y. 1952). Nor would a United States court have jurisdiction over
a civilian in that situation because this nation's criminal jurisdiction is confined
withih its own territory. See note 42, supra. As a result, a civilian would be com-
pletely free from prosecution or punishment.
'1io6 F. Supp. 455 (W. D. N. Y. 1952).
"See note 7, supra.
